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I. INTRODUCTION
Switzerland - the land of fine chocolates and precision timepieces -
is well known for its martial neutrality.' But, in 2009, as world markets
teetered on the brink of a global financial meltdown, Switzerland found
itself enmeshed in an international legal drama centering on what some
would cite as the most prominent feature of Switzerland's political-
economic constitution: bank secrecy. The dispute pitted United States tax
law against a well-established and fiercely protected tenet of Swiss law. On
the one side, the U.S. Department of Justice demanded Swiss-based UBS
AG (UBS) release the names of 52,000 Americans suspected of
establishing private Swiss bank accounts for the purposes of evading taxes;2
and on the other, Switzerland sought to uphold its 300-year-old time tested
practice of guaranteed secrecy for Swiss banking clients.3
The right to tax, and, by extension, the right to control the taxation
of economic activity inside one's national borders, comprises the very
essence of national sovereignty.4 Over the past 30 years, in response to
growing demand for offshore financial services, dozens of countries have
established themselves as jurisdictions of advantageous tax treatment
(JATTs).5  JATTs offer attractive terms and/or enhanced privileges for
* Juris Doctor, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, expected 2011.
'Helena Bachmann, U.S. vs. UBS: A Fight Over Secret Swiss Bank Accounts,
TIME, July 15, 2009, available at
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1910389,00.html.
2 See, e.g., Kevin McCoy, U.S. wants names of52,000 customers ofSwiss bank
UBS, USATODAY, Feb. 19,2009, http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/
brokerage/2009-02-18-ubs-settles-sec-chargesN.htm.
3 Historical Origins of Swiss Bank Secrecy,
http://switzerland.isyours.com/E/banking/secrecy/history.html (last visited Oct. 30,
2009).
4 CHRIS EDWARDS & DANIEL J. MITCHELL, GLOBAL TAX REVOLUTION: THE SIDE
OF TAX COMPETITION AND THE BATTLE TO DEFEND IT 175 (2008).
See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS,
110TH CONG., REPORT ON TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE (Comm.
Print 2008), available at
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foreign citizens utilizing financial products and/or services within the
JATT's political boundaries and typically provide for either nominal or no
taxation of assets transferred to their financial institutions by foreign
citizens.6 This escalation in demand has been attributed to a confluence of
factors, which include: (1) increased levels of taxation and expanded
regulatory authority in many industrialized nations; (2) political instability
and general legal and regulatory uncertainty in certain emerging markets;
(3) the rise of multinational corporations, whose primary stated allegiance
is to shareholders rather than to any particular sovereign body; (4) the
expansion of world trade, cross border investment and transactions, and
globalization, which can obfuscate claims to tax revenue; and (5) an
increase in both personal and corporate wealth, which has driven both the
need and capacity for complex financial planning and extra-national
7investment programs.
In the wake of rising national deficits and encroaching budgetary
constraints, certain industrialized nations have exhibited renewed resolve to
mitigate tax evasion following decades of more lenient postures towards
both JATTs and those who utilize them.8 Though JATTs have long been
identified as sources of concern for those seeking to prevent tax evasion and
curb international money laundering,9 the recent global financial crisis has
provided fresh political impetus to heed longstanding calls for increased
regulation of offshore financial centers (OFCs) and other JATTs.'0
Consequently, certain countries - specifically those standing to benefit most
substantially from the recapture of lost tax revenue resulting from its
citizens' reduced abilities to shield assets from taxation - have
demonstrated a markedly increased willingness to engage in coordinated,
united action to reduce the abilities of JATT based financial institutions to
knowingly or unknowingly facilitate tax evasion by citizens otherwise
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/071708PSIReport.pdf.
6 id.
7 See Welcome to Offshore Exclusive, http://www.offshoreexclusive.com (last
visited Oct. 30, 2009).
8 See David R. Francis, A Tougher Stance on Tax Havens, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Aug. 19, 2009, at 6.
9 Yishian Lin, Taiwan's Right to Tax, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS TAIWAN,
http://www.pwc.com/tw/en/challenges/taxation/indissue0261.jhtml (last visited
Feb. 1, 2010).
1o Orlando Femndez, International Regulation of Offshore Financial Centres:
Recent Developments in the Field of Tax Information Exchange, CBQ 5, at 5 (Oct.-
Dec. 2009),
http://crossborder.practicallaw.com/cs/Satellite?blobcol-urldata&blobheader-appli
cation%2Fpdf&blobkey-id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1247492072626
&ssbinary-true.
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subject to domestic taxation." As a result of such coordinated efforts, the
regulatory regime policing JATTs is likely to undergo significant structural
revisions aimed at improving the stability of the U.S. and world economies.
Such changes hold the potential to substantially redefine the scope and
reach of JATTs and OFCs.
This Note examines the key legal issues raised by the UBS tax
evasion case and the likely impact of this historic legal challenge to Swiss
banking secrecy. Additionally, this Note highlights key distinctions
between JATTs that enhance the function and efficiency of global markets
by promoting competition among sovereign tax setting bodies and those
that through bank secrecy laws provide foreign citizens a ready means of
sheltering assets from the purview of their domestic tax regimes.12 As we
shall see, sovereign bodies may impose competitive rates of taxation in
order to encourage business activity and commercial development," but
may not be permitted (either directly or indirectly through entities within
their jurisdictions) to counsel, aid and/or abet individuals seeking to bypass
and/or violate the laws of their home countries.14 Finally, to illustrate these
issues in a real world context, this Note presents the UBS-U.S. case history,
which demonstrates the means by which a Swiss bank has employed
banking practices, which were later deemed to have facilitated tax evasion
by certain of its U.S. clients.
II. OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS
A. Offshore Financial Centers (OFC)
1. Overview
While there exists no single accepted definition for OFCs, for the
purpose of this Note, an OFC shall be understood to mean: "Any country or
jurisdiction with a financial center that contains (1) a relatively large
number of financial institutions engaged primarily in business with non-
residents; (2) financial systems with external assets and liabilities out of
unusually high proportion to domestic financial intermediation designed to
finance domestic economies; or (3) centers which provide some or all of the
"1 See REPORT ON TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 5, at
18.
12 The Kudlow Report: IRS Offshore Crackdown (CNBC television broadcast Aug.
2009), available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/32491581.
1 Id.
14 d
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following services: low or zero taxation; moderate or light financial
regulation; banking secrecy and anonymity."' 5
OFCs range from centers with well-developed financial markets
and infrastructure, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, to centers with
smaller populations, such as the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands
and the Bahamas.' 6 They afford legitimate and important services in three
primary business units: (1) private investments, in which investments are
strategically managed to minimize tax liabilities and maximize protection
granted in accordance with statutory confidentiality provisions; (2) asset
protection, in which an individual's assets and income are protected by a
foreign international jurisdiction from political, fiscal and legal risks; and
(3) estate planning, in which the management of assets is completed in a
favorable legal and fiscal jurisdiction. 7  Additionally, other services
provided by OFCs include fund and asset management, insurance, trust
management, tax planning, and international business corporation (IBC)
activity.'8 Switzerland is currently the world leader in offshore wealth
management with a global market share of twenty-seven percent.9
2. Reasons to Establish an OFC
Jurisdictions establish OFCs for a number of reasons, including: (1)
increasing access to international capital markets; (2) attracting foreign
technical proficiency and skills; (3) raising employment levels; (4)
increasing government revenue through licensing and/or certification fees;
and (5) initiating competition in the domestic financial system. 20 Certain
OFCs, such as the Cayman Islands and the Channel Islands, rely on OFC
related business to boost government revenues and strengthen economic
activity.21 The Island of Jersey realizes approximately 80 percent of its
1 See IMF MONETARY AND EXCHANGE AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, OFFSHORE
FINANCIAL CENTERS IMF BACKGROUND PAPER (2000),
https://www.imf.org/extemal/np/mae/oshore/2000/eng/back.htm#I.
16 See id.; See David McFadden, Another Int'l Firm Seeks Exit from Cayman
Islands, TAIWAN NEWS ONLINE, Feb. 18, 2010,
http://www.etaiwannews.com/etn/news content.php?id= 1183101 &lang-engnews
&cate img-35.jpg&caterss-newsBusiness.
" Esther C. Suss, Oral H. Williams & Chandima Mendis, Caribbean Offshore
Financial Centers: Past, Present and Possibilities for the Future 4 (IMF Working
Paper, May 2002), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp0288.pdf.
8 IMF MONETARY AND EXCHANGE AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, supra note 15, at §
2(A).
19 Swiss BANKERS ASSOCIATION, BASEL, WEALTH MANAGEMENT IN SWITZERLAND
4 (2009), http://www.swissbanking.org/20081223-300-bro-
wealthmanagement2009-rva.pdf.20 IMF MONETARY AND EXCHANGE AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, supra note 15, § 2(A).
21 Id
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government revenues from taxing and licensing foreign companieS22 and its
banking sector contributes more than sixty percent of GDP and employs
more than twenty-five percent of the Island's working population.2 3
OFCs attract financial institutions and investors for several
important reasons. These include: (1) more convenient fiscal regimes
which lower explicit taxation and increase net profit margins; (2) adequate
legal frameworks that preserve the integrity of principal-agent relations; (3)
proximity to major financial centers; (4) reputation of the particular OFC;
and (5) freedom from exchange controls.24
Unfortunately, certain of these attributes have resulted in OFCs
being utilized for illicit purposes. That is, they can attract funds because
they provide depositors with a "cloak of anonymity" and the possibility of
tax avoidance or evasion.25 Though not necessarily harmful, the ability to
deliberately mislabel and hide funds can facilitate severe repercussions in
which dictators, terrorists groups and organized crime networks can easily
and secretly transfer their wealth around the world.26
3. Relationship Between OFCs and Banking Secrecy
Banking secrecy is most generally present in regimes in which bank
employees are legally obligated to keep clients' personal and financial
information under strict confidence 2 7 and is a virtually universal theme
present across OFCs throughout the world. Since many individuals cite
banking secrecy as their foremost concern in selecting banking
jurisdictions, OFC based regimes take their duty to protect client
information very seriously, to the point that in many jurisdictions, legal
prohibitions on the disclosure of information is further buttressed by
criminal sanctions, including fines and imprisonment.2 8
22 Charles Recknagel, Will G20 Crack Down on Tax Havens? (Radio Free Europe
Radio Liberty, Apr. 1, 2009),
http://www.rferl.org/content/WillG20_CrackDownOnTaxHavens/1566041.ht
ml (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
23 Jersey - Overview, USATODAY.COM,
http://www.usatoday.com/marketplace/ibi/jersey.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).24 Recknagel, supra note 22.
25 id
26 d
27 See Ankur Poddar, Swati Aggarwal & Peeyush Razdan, The Future ofBank
Secrecy and Switzerland 2 (Aug. 11, 2009), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1460713.
28 Asset Protection Law Center, http://www.rjmintz.com/bank-secrecy.html (last
visited Feb. 1, 2010).
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All countries with central banking systems possess at least minimal
forms of banking secrecy - that is, norms, rules and regulations that
prohibit sharing client information with unauthorized parties. 2 9 However,
the standard of protection afforded by that secrecy - including, what
information may be shared, with whom and under what circumstances -
varies widely across the globe.3 o
III. BANKING SECRECY
A. Banking Secrecy in Switzerland
Proudly neutral,3 ' the Swiss conception of democracy avows that
the State fundamentally exists to serve its citizens.32 Reflecting this
concept, the Swiss Constitution emphasizes personal liberties and privacy
and censures the erosion of privacy through governmental supervision.3 3
The Swiss conception of banking secrecy draws from this standard of
personal privacy, interweaving the principle into the very fabric of legal
doctrine that governs Swiss society. Although Swiss law does not
explicitly define Swiss banking secrecy, according to legal custom, and for
the purpose of this Note, Swiss banking secrecy shall be understood to
mean: "a banker's professional obligation to keep in strict confidence all
business and affairs related to the financial and personal circumstances of
clients and some third parties, to the extent that knowledge of such matters
is acquired in the course of business." 34 Despite its broad reach, however,
Swiss banking secrecy is not absolute. Rather, it is a singular and discrete
rule expressed more generally within the larger body of legal provisions,
which comprise Swiss public and private law and, thus, must be evaluated
in this context.
29 See The Future of Bank Secrecy and Switzerland, supra note 27, at 2.
30 id
31 Id. Switzerland (population 7.6 million) did not join the United Nations until
2002 and does not belong to the European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. Military service is compulsory, giving the country a standing militia
of 220,000. By law, every Swiss resident must have access to a nuclear bunker, at
home or in the neighborhood. Id.
32 Federal Department of Finance FDF,
http://www.efd.admin.ch/dokumentation/zahlen/00579/00607/0062 1/index.html?la
ng-en (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
33 id
34 DENNIS CAMPBELL, INTERNATIONAL BANK SECRECY 663-99 at 669 (1992).
3 See Federal Department of Finance FDF, supra note 32.
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1. Origins
Modem Swiss banking secrecy is the product of long-term
historical development.36 The Swiss banker's pledge of secrecy dates to the
beginning of Swiss banking activity in the sixteenth century, when the
concept was introduced as a customary law. In an unpublished decision
from the sixteenth century, for example, the Swiss Federal Court ruled that
a bank was required to observe the secrecy of its client, regardless of
whether a special agreement existed.3 8
In 1934, the violation of Swiss banking secrecy was codified as a
crime by the Swiss Parliament in the Federal Act on Banks and Saving
Banks ("Bank Act") 3 9 after the French and German governments sought to
obtain client information in an effort to prevent capital flight from their
respective countries.40 Specifically, Article 47(b) of the Bank Act made the
divulgence of "any information" relating to the client a criminal offense.41
36 James G. Steproe Jr., The "Secret" Swiss Account: End of an Era, 38 BROOK. L.
REv. 384, 384 (1972), available at
http://heinonline.org/HOL/PDF?handle=hein.journals/brklr38&collection-journals
&id=404&print- &sectioncount-l 1 &ext--.pdf
37 Id. at 385.
38 Kurt Mueller, The Swiss Banking Secret: From a Legal View, 18 THE INT'L AND
COMP. L. Q. 360, 361 (Apr. 1969), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/757529.
39 See generally KPMG, Swiss Federal Law on Banks and Savings Banks,
http://www.kpmg.ch/docs/20090101-BankA.pdf.
40 Alexandre Ziegler et al., Negotiating over Banking Secrecy: The Case of
Switzerland and the European Union (2005), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-830784.
4' Article 47(b) of the Swiss Federal Bank Act of November 8, 1934, provides:
Anyone who in his capacity as an officer or employee of a bank,
or as an auditor or his employee, or as a member of the banking
commission or as an officer or employee of its bureau
intentionally violates his duty to observe silence or his
professional rule of secrecy or anyone who induces or attempts to
induce a person to commit any such offence, shall be liable to a
fine of up to 50,000 francs or imprisonment for up to six months,
or both.
Lio f6ddrale sur les banques et les caisses d'6pargne [LB] [Swiss Federal
Banking Act], Nov. 8, 1934, Recueil systdmatique du droit federal [RO]
952.0, art. 47 (Switz.);
"If the offender acted with negligence he shall be liable to a fine up to 30,000
francs." Trade Dev. Bank v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 40 n.2 (2d Cir. 1972);
The secrecy provisions were not included in the first draft of the law, which mainly
concerned administrative matters such as bank supervision. The provisions, found
in Article 47(b), were added before passage of the bill due to Nazi authorities'
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The primary thrust of the law was reaffirmed in 1984 when seventy-three
percent of Swiss voters agreed to preserve the concept of banking secrecy
within the country.42 However, the Bank Act does not clearly delineate
under which circumstances banks have the right or duty to provide
information and today, the scope and application of professional obligations
stemming from banking secrecy remain primarily a matter of private law.43
2. Swiss Banking Secrecy Coverage
Swiss banking secrecy protects client privacy in accordance with
the constitution and laws of Switzerland." Article 13 of the Swiss Federal
Constitution grants every person "the right to receive respect for his/her
private and family life."4A This covers privacy regarding financial income
and assets, but excludes abuses of a criminal nature.46 Accordingly, Swiss
bank secrecy covers "all the business relations of the client with the
bank."A7 This comprises any and all information of either a business or
personal nature obtained in connection with the business transactions of and
consultations with its clients.48 For example, all communications with the
bank, even if an account is never actually opened, are protected under
banking secrecy provisions.49
Under the Bank Act, solely the client can authorize the bank to
disclose information.50 Article 273 of the Swiss Criminal Code extends the
coverage however, and makes it a crime for a bank to divulge information,
even after being authorized in a special agreement by the client.s'
Additionally, Swiss banking secrecy coverage of clients perseveres
indefinitely, surviving even the closure of accounts and the time at which a
bank's contractual commitments have been fully performed.s2
attempts to investigate the assets of Jews and "enemies of the state" held in
Switzerland. Mueller, supra note 38, at 361.
42 Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, The Other Banking Drama:
Those Secret Swiss Accounts, Knowledge@Wharton, Mar. 4, 2009, at 1,
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/articlepdf/2173.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
4 Mueller, supra note 38, at 362.
" Swiss Bankers Association, http://www.swissbanking.org/en/home/dossier-
bankkundengeheimnis/dossier-bankkundengeheimnis-themen-geheimnis.htm (last
visited Mar. 8, 2010).
45 d
4 Id.
47 Poddar, supra note 27, at 3.
48 Mueller, supra note 38, at 362.
49 Poddar, supra note 27, at 3.
50 Id
5' Id
52 id
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Due to the private law nature of Swiss banking secrecy, a bank may
not plead that its obligation to uphold secrecy is in the public interest.53
Swiss law requires that a bank is be able to produce all information relating
to a client's transactions for up to ten years, upon request from that client. 54
In relation to third parties, however, banks are generally prohibited from
disclosing facts that are subject to Swiss banking secrecy. This rule
encompasses all communications, including those with private persons,
government authorities, and third-party banks. Furthermore, with regard to
international relations, the Bank Act applies to all subsidiaries and branch
offices of foreign banks established in Switzerland and, as such, extend
Swiss banking secrecy duties and restrictions applicable to Swiss banks.55
3. Legal Consequences of Violating Bank-Client
Confidentiality
Any violation of the protection afforded in accordance with Swiss
banking secrecy - whether negligent or intentional - is punishable by a
prison sentence of up to three years or by a fine up to 250,000 Swiss Francs
(CHF).56  Violation of bank-client confidentiality remains a punishable
offense even after the relationship with the clients has ceased.57
Statutorily there are two principal laws that protect client privacy:
Article 273 of the Swiss Criminal Code and Article 47 of the Bank Act.58
Article 273 of the Swiss Criminal Code provides:
Whoever seeks to discover a manufacturing or business
secret in order to make it accessible to a foreign official
agency or a foreign organization or foreign enterprise or
their agents, whoever makes a manufacturing or business
secret accessible to a foreign official agency or a foreign
organization or private enterprise or their agents, shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for up to three years or a fine, in
5 Mueller, supra note 38, at 363.
SId.
5 Id.; Lio f6d6rale sur les banques et les caisses d'6pargne [LB] [Swiss Federal
Banking Act], Nov. 8, 1934, Recueil syst6matique du droit federal [RO] 952.0, art.
47 (Switz.), available at http://www.kpmg.ch/docs/20090101 -BankA.pdf.
56 Swiss Bankers Association, Bank Client Confidentiality, supra note 44. As of
March 7, 2010, CHF 250,000 = approximately 233,700.00 USD.
57 Id.
58 Brief for Government of Switzerland as Amicus Curiae, United States v. UBS
AG, No. 109CV20423, 2009 WL 1612394, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2009).
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serious cases, to imprisonment for not less than one year.
A fine can be combined with the imprisonment. 9
Since 1984, there have been twenty-six convictions for violations
of Article 273 .6o Additionally, Article 47 instructs that anyone acting in his
capacity as a member of a banking body, as a bank employee, agent or
liquidator, or as a member of a body or an employee belonging to an
accredited auditing institution, be prohibited from divulging information
entrusted to him or of which he has learned because of his position. Since
1993, there have been forty-eight convictions for violations of Article 47 .
Article 47 of the Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks provides:
1. Whoever intentionally:
a. divulges a secret entrusted to him in his capacity
as a management body, employee, mandatory or
liquidator of a bank, as an officer or employee of
an audit company or that he became aware of in
this capacity;
b. seeks to induce others to such a violation of
professional secrecy shall be sentenced to
imprisonment of up to three years or a fine.
2. Where the offender acts through negligence, he or she is
liable to a fine for up to CHF 250,000.
3. In the case of a repetition of the offense within five years
of the conviction taking full legal effect, the monetary
penalty will be a minimum of 45 daily penalty units.
4. Violation of professional secrecy remains punishable
after termination of the official relationship or the
practice of the profession.
5. Federal and Cantonal regulations concerning the
obligation to testify and to furnish information to a
government authority remain reserved.
6. Prosecution and judgment of the acts under this
provision are the responsibility of the cantons. The
general provisions of the Swiss Criminal Code shall
apply.6 2
4. Limits of Swiss Bank-Client Confidentiality
59 Id., quoting Strafgesetzbueh [StGB] [Criminal Code] Nov. 13, 1998, SR 311.0,
art. 273 (Switz.).60 id.
61 Id.
62 Id.; See also Strafgesetzbueh [StGB] [Criminal Code] Nov. 13, 1998, SR 952.0,
art. 4 (Switz.), available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/952_0/a47.html (original
German).
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A Swiss banker's obligation to respect a client's privacy is subject
to overriding provisions of the Swiss Penal Code and, so, is not absolute.
Specifically, a Swiss bank's obligations to professional secrecy may be
lifted and the bank compelled to provide information in (1) cases of civil
proceedings; (2) criminal proceedings; (3) matters of debt, bankruptcy, and
tax administration; and (4) dealings with foreign authorities." Ultimately,
the decision to maintain or divulge secret information is a question of law;
whether a provision of public law overrides the financial institution's
primary duty of secrecy. Consequently, it is the responsibility of the courts
- not the banks - to determine whether disclosure of account information is
warranted.
B. Other Countries with Banking Secrecy
While Switzerland is the world's largest OFC, managing about one-
third of an estimated $7 trillion of worldwide offshore assets, financial
centers with banking secrecy laws exist worldwide. The degree of
professional secrecy prescribed by banking secrecy laws varies from one
jurisdiction to another. Historically, countries in Europe (such as Austria,
Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, the Channel Islands, Gibraltar), the Caribbean
(such as the Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos), and
Asia Pacific (such as Singapore and Hong Kong) have each established
strict banking secrecy laws.6 5 Additionally, because Panama is one of the
few countries in the world never to have signed a tax treaty, depositors
there limit their risks of statutorily mandated identity exposure.
Recent international pressure has persuaded a number of OFCs to
relax their banking secrecy laws. However, Swiss bankers have
confirmed their resolve to preserve Swiss banking secrecy laws despite an
63 Mueller, supra note 38, at 364.
6 Id.
65 Poddar, supra note 27, at 5. For an updated status of bank secrecy in Europe see:
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLO14119520090924.
66 Panama Legal, S.A.,
http://www.panamalaw.org/taxinformationexchangeagreements.html (last
visited Feb. 1, 2010). In Panama, all tax offenses are civil including tax fraud.
When one country requests information, relating to a crime there is a principal
applied called dual criminality. Dual criminality means that the crime in question
must be a crime in the requesting country and in the requested country. The dual
criminality provisions provide safeguards to prevent abuses. Since Panama has no
crimes pertaining to taxes, this is not an issue in Panama. Id.
67 Poddar, supra note 27, at 4.
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overwhelming lack of support from the international community.68 To the
contrary, Swiss banks have launched a targeted counter-offensive, claiming
the renewed global interest in curbing Swiss banking secrecy to be an
attempt by foreign banks and government bureaucrats to capture assets
currently held in Swiss banks in order to bolster their home countries' own
69
depleted treasuries.
C. Offshore Banking, Bank Secrecy & Tax Evasion
1. Background
Offshore tax evasion has existed for centuries. Records as early as
1159 A.D. document the efforts of ship merchants and traders to avoid
paying duties on merchandise by carefully relocating their activities from
one port to another. 70 It was not until the advent of national-level income
taxes in the 20th century, however, that modern-day "tax havens" (referred
to in this Note as JATTs) were developed.7'
In the 1920s, a small number of nations, including Bermuda,
Switzerland, Liechtenstein and the Channel Islands, ratified tax laws
deliberately designed to attract foreign capital by offering taxes at reduced
rates.72 Additionally, other jurisdictions marketed themselves as havens of
"banking privacy."73 The utilization of JATTs soon became a popular and
established method for wealthy individuals and businesses to shield income
from taxes imposed by their home countries, resulting in a proliferation of
tax havens across the world; by the 1950s, dozens nations could be
qualified as JATTs.74 The reason for such rapid growth can be attributed to
two primary accelerants.75 First, high marginal national-level income tax
rates led citizens to seek alternative opportunities. For example, the UK's
top marginal tax rate exceeded eighty percent.n Second, improvements in
telecommunications and the growth in international travel enabled
68 See John Stonestreet, UBS Tax Deal is Swiss Bank Secrecy's Waterloo, REUTERS,
Feb. 19, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE51IlZP20090219.
69 Stephanie Baker & Warren Giles, Geneva Sees Opportunity in Bern's
Concessions on Bank Secrecy, BLOOMBERG, July 1, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=apQp8dVyoPKg.70 PLN Lawyers,
http://www.pln.com.aulindex.php?option=com-content&task-wiew&id=84 (last
visited Oct. 30, 2009).
n Id.
72 id.
7 Id.
74 id
75 See id.
76 id.
7 Id.
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individuals and companies to identify and engage in alternative banking
options with increasing ease and limited disruption.78
By 1956, the list of JATTs included Liberia, Panama, Curacao, the
Bahamas, Luxembourg, Uruguay, Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Aden,
Lebanon, Gibraltar, Rhodesia and the Solomon Islands.7 9  Each national
JATT established its own tax scheme and rules for enforcing such
scheme.so
As JATTs increased in both numbers and importance, so too did the
controversy surrounding them. JATTs were increasingly criticized for
diluting tax bases and causing an unfair shift of the overall tax burden from
wealthy tax evaders to loyal middle class taxpayers. 1 In February 1961,
one month into his new administration, President John F. Kennedy called
for an end to the abuse of "foreign tax havens," and asked Congress to
enact legislation to force such JATTs "out of existence."82
In the late 1980s, the G-7 and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD)1 threatened to dismantle the most
flagrant JATTs through the imposition of targeted sanctions.8
Additionally, the OECD began issuing reports and guidelines outlining
harmful tax practices85 and engaged in dialogue aimed at among other
78 id.
Burton Crane, Tax Havens Draw Many Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1956,
at 135.
80 PLN Lawyers, supra note 70.
' Crane, supra note 79.
82 Robert Metz, Users of 'Tax Havens' Abroad Batten Down for Political Gale,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1961, at Fl.
83 The OECD is an intergovernmental economic organization in which the 30
member countries discuss, develop and analyze economic and social policy. The
OECD is organized around three main bodies: the Council, the Committees, and
the Secretariat. Committees are comprised of representatives of all the member
countries. The overriding committee is the Council, which has decision-making
power. It is composed of one representative for each member country, generally at
the level of Ambassador, gives guidance to the OECD, and directs its work. JAMES
JACKSON, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 2 (2007), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21128.pdf.
8 PLN Lawyers, supra note 70.
85 Id. For the purposes of this Note, "harmful tax practices" are tax practices that
are anti-competitive and undermine fair competition and public confidence in tax
systems. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development,
http://www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en_2649_337451_1_1_1_1 ,00.html (last
visited, March 14, 2010).
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things, eliminating preferential tax regimes within OECD member states.
The "Harmful Tax Practices" project launched in 1996 at the directive of
the G-7 and the first report stemming therefrom, "Harmful Tax
Competition: An Emerging Global Issue"87 was released in 1998. Today,
forty-eight years after President Kennedy's declaration, President Barack
Obama has embarked upon a comparable mission to mitigate the existence
of JATTs, vowing to "detect and pursue" U.S. tax evaders who utilize
"offshore tax shelters."
2. How Offshore Arrangements Facilitate Tax Evasion
Limited transparency regarding financial activities in foreign
jurisdictions may tempt individuals and corporations to conceal illegal
activity from domestic regulators and enforcement officials through the use
of offshore entities. 90 For example, individuals can exploit corporate
entities to mask the ownership of assets or income through the use of
limited liability corporations (LLCs), limited liability partnerships (LLPs),
and IBCs, as well as trusts, foreign financial accounts, debit or credit cards,
and other related instruments. 91 According to the U.S. Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), offshore schemes have become increasingly complex -
sometimes containing multiple legal and structural layers as well as myriad
transactions in an effort to obfuscate the true nature and ownership of the
assets or income. 92
Additionally, establishing offshore entities is generally both simple
and inexpensive.93 For example, a Cayman Islands exempted company94
86 OECD, PROMOTING TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX
PURPOSES 7(2010), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/45/43757434.pdf. The
OECD has declared the project a success. By 2004, all but one of the preferential
tax regimes identified within the OECD had been abolished, amended or found not
to be harmful. The only outstanding regime was the Luxembourg 1929 holding
company regime. In December 2006, Luxembourg enacted legislation to abolish
the regime by the end of 2010. Id.
87 Id. Luxembourg and Switzerland abstained in the approval of the report. Id. at
7.88 id.
8 Associated Press, Obama Cracks Down on Overseas Tax Loopholes,
MSNBC.COM, May 4, 2009, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30557517/.
90 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE
CHAIRMAN AND RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, U.S. SENATE, 32
(2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08778.pdf.
91 U. S. Gov'T ACCT. OFFICE, TAX COMPLIANCE: OFFSHORE FINANCIAL ACTIVITY
CREATES ENFORCEMENT ISSUES FOR IRS (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/htext/d09478t.html.
92 U.S. Gov'T ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 90.
9 U.S. GOV'T ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 91.
2010 Is Bank Secrecy Still Bankable?: 365
A Critical Review ofBank Secrecy Law, Tax Evasion
and UBS
can be created for less than US$60095 and the company is neither required
to maintain a register of shareholders in the Cayman Islands nor hold
96
annual shareholders' meetings. Other offshore jurisdictions provide
comparable advantages to those seeking to establish offshore entities.9 7
Furthermore, because taxpayers' compliance in offshore
jurisdictions is largely dependent upon voluntary self-reporting, individuals
might be tempted to underreport earnings realized in JATTs and thus, avoid
paying the full amounts dictated by their domestic tax regimes.9 8
According to an IRS study, in the absence of third party reporting of
taxpayers' income to the IRS, such taxpayers tend to include less than half
of the relevant reportable income on their tax returns. 99
Importantly, large international financial firms have suffered
accusations of responsibility by U.S. governmental bodies for advising U.S.
clients on the use of offshore structures to conceal assets and evade U.S.
taxes. 00 In 2008, for example, the IRS announced that Liechtenstein
Global Trust Group (LGT), a leading Liechtenstein-based financial
institution, assisted U.S. citizens in evading taxes. In a separate case,
Bradley Birkenfeld, a director in the private banking division of UBS, pled
guilty in Federal district court in June 2008 to conspiring with an American
billionaire real estate developer and Swiss bankers to help the developer
avoid the payment of $7.2 million in owed taxes by assisting in concealing
$200 million of assets in Switzerland and Liechtenstein.' 0 ' Birkenfeld
admitted that from 2001 through 2006, while he was employed at UBS, he
regularly traveled to the U.S. in an effort to assist wealthy Americans
conceal their ownership of assets held offshore and avoid paying taxes on
94 If the proposed activities of a company are to be executed primarily outside the
Cayman Islands, the company may register as an exempted company. Amongst
other characteristics, an exempted Cayman's company does not have to: (1) keep a
register of members open for public inspection; (2) hold an annual general meeting;
or (3) use "Limited" or the abbreviation "Ltd." after its name. Additionally, an
exempted company may: (1) issue shares with nominal or no par value; and (2)
express its capital in any currency. Investing in Cayman,
http://www.caymanchamber.ky/investing/business.htm.
9 This figure was calculated without considering likely service providers' fees.
U.S. Gov'T ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 90, at 27.
96 Id. This process is comparable to the regulatory process in the United States
wherein notice is given of proposed rulemaking and the public is invited to
comment on the proposed rules. Id. at 27 n.25.
9 See id. at 26.
9 U.S. Gov'T ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 91.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id
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the income generated from those assets.02 In February 2009, UBS entered
into a deferred prosecution agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) for scheming to defraud the U.S. government by facilitating the
concealment of assets of U.S. citizens through UBS accounts held in the
names of "nominees and/or sham entities." 0 3  As a result of such
proceedings, UBS agreed to pay $780 million in fines, penalties, interest
and restitution for its actions in connection with the case.1
3. JATTs
a. A brief debate: proponents vs. opponents
Proponents of JATTs argue that their benefits outweigh their
detriments. Many JATTs are former Western European colonies that would
not have survived without the foreign capital their advantageous tax rates
and banking practices are responsible for attracting.'os Additionally, JATTs
offer individuals in emerging market nations invaluable access to safe bank
accounts in stable currencies while shielding deposits from currency
controls that limit the quantities of funds individuals must transfer into or
out of his home country.'0 6  Finally, to wealthy persons, anonymous
accounts are considered an invaluable tool for legitimate purposes.'07
Critics, on the other hand, purport the systemic and internationally
scaled damage caused by JATTs outweighs the remuneration and other
benefits accruing to host regimes. Specifically, opponents argue the
existence of JATTs directly inhibit non-JATT governments' abilities to
obtain the requisite tax receipts necessary to build roads, fund schools, and
otherwise sustain civic life.'os The OECD reports that as of 2009, the value
102id.
103 Id A nominee is a party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others or
who receives and distributes funds for the benefit of others. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). A sham entity is an organization that is not what it
seems. Id.
104 U.S. GoV'T ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 91.
105 Recknagel, supra note 22.
106 The Other Banking Drama, supra note 42.
107 Id. For example, banking in a country with bank secrecy laws can (1) provide a
depositor shelter from a politically unstable home country; (2) enable companies to
avoid high inflation rates in their home country; and (3) provide a haven for
individuals facing oppression in their home country (such as the Jews in Nazi,
Germany). See, e.g., Sidney Weintraub, Disrupting the Financing of Terrorism,
WASH. Q., Winter 2002, at 56, available at
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington quarterly/v025/25. I weintraub.pdf.
108 Recknagel, supra note 22. See also OECD Estimates $11 Trillion Parked in
Tax Havens, Bus. STANDARD, Apr. 4, 2009, http://www.business-
standard.com/india/news/oecd-estimates- 11 -trillion-parked-in-tax-havens/353935/.
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of assets held in JATTs ranges from $1.7 trillion to $11.5 trillion, which
translates into billions of dollars in lost tax revenues. 09
b. Developments in the OECD tax haven list
Over the past decade numerous modifications have been made to
transparency requirements and exchange of information practices between
and among both national and international regulatory bodies in an effort to
decrease the number of jurisdictions deemed by the OECD to be
functioning as tax havens. In June 2000, over forty jurisdictions were
identified by the OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs as qualifying as
Uncooperative Tax Havens (UTHs)." 0 By 2007, however, a majority of
such qualifying jurisdictions had committed to implement transparency and
exchange of information reforms sufficient to result in their de-listing as tax
havens.
By 2002, only three jurisdictions remained on the OECD's list of
UTHs: Andorra, Monaco and Liechtenstein."' In March 2009, these
remaining three UTHs declared their intent to implement international
standards in a timely manner and, as such, were removed from the OECD's
list in May 2009.' 12 The OECD does not currently categorize any
jurisdictions as UTHs." 3
The key principles of transparency and exchange of information for
tax purposes has been summarized by the OECD as: (1) exchange of
information on request where it is "foreseeably relevant" to the
administration and enforcement of the domestic laws of a treaty partner; (2)
no restrictions on exchange caused by bank secrecy or domestic tax interest
requirements; (3) availability of reliable information, particularly
accounting, bank and ownership information and powers to obtain it; (4)
respect for taxpayers' rights; and (5) strict confidentiality of information
exchanged.'14
109 d
"o JEFFREY OWENS, COUNTERING OFFSHORE TAX EVASION 12 (2009) available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/13/42469606.pdf.
Ill ORG. FOR EcON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., LIST OF UNCO-OPERATIVE TAX
HAVENS (2009),
http://www.oecd.org/document/57/0,3343,en_2649_33745_30578809_1_1_1_1,00.
html.
112 id.
11 id.
114 id
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4. The Broader Policy Implications of Offshore Evasion
Tax evasion facilitated by OFCs imparts adverse effects extending
beyond lost revenue for a home nation. Financial experts assert that
offshore tax evasion also undermines the fairness and integrity of national
tax systems and negatively affects the willingness of law-abiding taxpayers
to voluntarily comply with statutorily defined tax obligations."' Public
attitudes towards tax compliance are influenced by perception and the
"voluntary" element of compliance can be badly eroded if a minority of
taxpayers, usually those with significant incomes, can avoid or are
perceived to be evading their taxes.'16 Furthermore, tax evasion techniques
employed by certain individuals restricts the abilities of governments to
decrease statutory tax rates for general populaces. As Treasury Secretary
Henry Paulson conveyed in testimony before the Senate Financing
Committee, "when people fail to pay their taxes, it serves as a defacto tax
increase on everyone else."' 17
Since tax evaders' decisions on where to domicile funds is often
motivated by the ease by which evasion techniques can be implemented in a
particular jurisdiction (as opposed to being motivated by marginal
differences in the true economic return on capital due to advisory and/or
execution expertise, for example), competition based on banking secrecy
and deficient tax cooperation/coordination has the potential significantly to
diminish the furtherance of global economic welfare." This
unconstructive result stems at least partially from the reduction in gross
returns on investment of JATT domiciled funds to reflect the fees and
expenses associated with, among others, scheme promoters, arrangers,
advisors, offshore trustees, and nominees.
Excessive banking secrecy and a lack of multilateral tax
cooperation is especially detrimental in developing countries where
offshore tax evasion may further erode weak tax bases.12 0  In such
jurisdictions, even relatively small amounts (by international standards) of
unreported assets can divert substantial proportions of critical governmental
revenue. This lost revenue can have far-reaching results by jeopardizing
such governments' abilities to invest in the vital social services and
infrastructure projects upon which long-term sustainable economic
" The Role of Exchange of Information: Hearing Before the S. Fin. Comm. on
Offshore Tax Evasion, 110th Cong. 5 (2007) (written testimony of Jeffrey Owens,
Dir., OECD Center for Tax Policy and Administration), available at
http://www.ceff.univ-cezanne.fr/documents/owen.doc.
116 id.
" Id.
1' Id.
"1 Id.
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development depends. 12 1 Ultimately, excessive banking secrecy and an
unwillingness of countries to cooperate to counter tax havens undermine the
national fiscal sovereignty of these countries. 122 In a global economy,
individual governments are capable of maintaining sovereignty over the
design of their respective tax systems only insofar as they can rely on the
international community to share information needed to enforce their tax
policy decisions - decisions that reflect their respective economic, social
and political needs and preferences.123
IV. GLOBAL RESPONSE: INITIATIVES To COMBAT OFFSHORE TAX
ABUSE
Concerns about abuses of OFCs and the role of JATTs in
facilitating tax evasion are longstanding. Over the past decade, the U.S.
and the international community have undertaken several initiatives to
oppose such abuses and in recent years, this effort has intensified. 124 For
example, at the London Summit in April 2009, the G-20 Communiqud
issued a report expressing the organization's intention to take actions
against (including potentially imposing sanctions on) non-cooperative
jurisdictions, including several JATTs, in an effort to strengthen global
financial supervision and regulation. 12 5 While the global community's
ability to produce a panacean solution to international tax evasion appears
unlikely, a modular approach involving discrete, but complimentary
elements has been initiated to eliminate opportunities for tax avoidance on a
piecemeal basis. A brief summary of select initiatives follows.
A. International Provisions for Tax Information Exchange
Exchange of information between sovereign tax authorities can be
accomplished either bilaterally or multilaterally. When coordination
between tax jurisdictions is pursued on a bilateral basis, two primary types
121 Id.
122 id
123 id.
12 4 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra
note 5, at 18. For example, in 2006, the Australian Government pledged to spend
$300 million over seven years to fund a taskforce to investigate internationally
promoted tax arrangements that allegedly involve tax avoidance or evasion.
Australian Taxation Office,
http://www.ato.gov.au/corporate/content.asp?doc=/content/00 169431 .htm (last
visited Mar. 8, 2010).
125 G20, THE GLOBAL PLAN FOR RECOVERY AND REFORM 4 (2009),
http://www.g20.org/Documents/fmal-communique.pdf.
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of agreements are utilized: Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs) and Tax
Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs).12 6
1. Double Taxation Treaties127
DTTs are comprehensive agreements between two sovereign tax
jurisdictions to prevent income and/or profits derived from international
economic activity from being subject to two separate tax regimes. A
primary reason for countries to enter into DTTs is to foster cross-border
investment and economic activity by enhancing after tax returns to
corporations and investors who would otherwise find their assets and/or
profits significantly decreased due to taxation under multiple tax regimes.
There are over 2,000 such bilateral treaties currently in existence. 12 8
The U.S. is currently party to fifty-seven DTTs, under which
foreign states have agreed to mechanisms and standards defining the means
by which evidence relevant to tax law enforcement can be exchanged.12 9
DTTs generally include the reciprocal agreement of the treaty parties to
exchange evidence relating to tax law enforcement in special situations.130
Almost all U.S. DTTs limit information sharing to instances in which the
requesting state makes a specific, targeted request.
As of May 1951, Switzerland is one of the many nations with
whom the U.S. has executed a DTT.13 1 In 1996, the U.S. and Switzerland
entered into a new DTT, which was later ratified in 1997. Like the 1951
treaty and like other DTTs the United States has executed, the 1996 DTT
requires a particularized showing of relevance in order information to be
exchanged in compliance with both U.S. and Swiss law. Under a 2003
"Mutual Agreement" concerning the 1996 Treaty, each party must
126 ax Justice Network, Tax Information Exchange Arrangements (Draft TJN
Briefing Paper, 2009),
http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/TJN0903_Exchangeof Info Briefing
draft.pdf.
127 DTTs are also referred to as Double Taxation Agreements (or DTAs) in this
Note.
128 Tax Justice Network, supra note 126.
129 IRS Publication 515 (rev. Mar. 2010), p. 54-55, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p515.pdf (listing DTAs to which the United States
is a party as of December 31, 2008).130 Brief of UBS AG, United States v. UBS AG, No. 109CV20423, 2009 WL
1612393, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2009).
13 'id.
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demonstrate a "reasonable suspicion" of "tax fraud or the like" to secure
assistance under the treaty.132
The most current version of the OECD Model DTA (Model DTA)
was developed in 2005.133 It provides for the exchange of information
which is "foreseeably relevant" for the "administration or enforcement of
... taxes of every kind" and requires both parties to use its powers to obtain
and provide such information even if it is not needed for its own tax
purposes (Art. 26 (4)).134 Additionally, the 2005 version overrides banking
secrecy by mandating that bank secrecy cannot serve as a reason for
categorical refusal to exchange information (Art. 26 (5)).13s Earlier versions
of the Model DTA were much weaker in that they were limited to the
exchange of information necessary for the purposes of the treaty, which
many states interpreted as meaning only to prevent double taxation, but not
to prevent tax evasion and avoidance. 36
2. Tax Information Exchange Agreements
The second type of treaty is the TIEA. TIEAs are intended for use
with offshore jurisdictions that either do not want to, or are not eligible to,
enter into fully-fledged DTTs with their major trading partners.137 While
TIEAs are narrower in scope than DTTs, they are more comprehensive than
DTTs on the subject of information exchange. 3 8
A TIEA often provides for exchange of information regarding the
beneficial ownership of companies or trusts based upon a formal request
received by the competent authority in the signatory nations.139 Typically, a
request must be made on an individual case basis and the subject of the
request must be under investigation in the requesting jurisdiction.140 The
requesting country must also have pursued "all means available" within its
own jurisdiction and strict confidentiality provisions ensure that
132 Id., quoting Mutual Agreement Regarding the Administration of Article 26 of
the Swiss-U.S. Income Tax Convention of October 2, 1996, U.S.-Switz., 5, Jan.
23, 2003.
133 Tax Justice Network, supra note 126, at 2.
I34 Id.
135 id
136 Id. It is important to note that many existing DTAs still use the older version of
article 26. Id.
137 The Lowtax Network, http://www.usa-international-offshore-company-
tax.com/taxinfo exchange.asp (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
138 Tax Justice Network, supra note 126, at 2.
139 The Lowtax Network, supra note 137.
140 id
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information is not leaked to third parties.14' The TIEA is not a binding
instrument; rather, it provides two draft models for bilateral agreements.14 2
To-date, numerous bilateral agreements have been based on this
Agreement.14 3
Modem TIEAs are based on an OECD Model Agreement released
in April 2002 by the Global Forum on Taxation, which consisted of
representatives from OECD Member countries as well as delegates from
Aruba, Bermuda, Bahrain, Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Isle of Man, Malta,
Mauritius, the Netherlands Antilles, the Seychelles and San Marino.'"
B. Qualified Intermediary Program (QI Program)
In 2000, the IRS established the QI program, which encourages
foreign investment in U.S. institutions by simplifying reporting
requirements for foreign banks investing and/or depositing funds therein. 145
In accordance with the program, the IRS enters into agreements with
foreign financial institutions (mostly banks) that commit to serve as
"qualified intermediaries" by collecting, processing, and documenting U.S.
source income information from its customers.146  Amongst other
requirements, the QI must identify American investors receiving U.S.
source income through the QI, which benefits the IRS in its quest to
increase transparency.147
141 Id.
142 Tax Information Exchange Agreements, Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development,
http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3343,en_2649_33767_38312839_1_1_1_37427
,00.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
143 id.
'" Tax Information Exchange Agreements, Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development,
http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3343,en_2649_3376738312839_11__1 1,00.h
tml (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
145 Tax Haven Banks and U. S. Tax Compliance - Obtaining the Names of US.
Clients with Swiss Accounts: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 11I th Cong. 3
(2009) (prepared testimony of Doug Shulman Commissioner IRS), available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore id=40
341 c8c-e8af-4160-a90a-c580585d2fe0 [hereinafter Shulman Testimony].
'" Tax Policy Center,
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/20 11 Budget offshore.cfm (last visited
Feb. 10, 2010). The primary document is a "withholding certificate," by which
customers certify whether they are U.S. citizens or residents and, if neither,
whether they qualify for reduced U.S. withholding tax. Id.
17Id.
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In exchange for entering into a QI agreement, foreign financial
institutions are granted the authority to determine the appropriate amounts
of U.S. withholding taxes, thereby eliminating the need for clients to file for
refunds of excess withholding taxes. 148  By allowing foreign banks to
reports funds subject to withholding on an aggregate basis for all foreign
customers invested in U.S. securities, the onerous requirements placed upon
foreign institutions managing U.S. investments on behalf of clients is
greatly reduced. 149 The QI program has been successful and well utilized
by larger foreign institutions, and most major international financial
institutions have already enrolled as QI participants. 50
The IRS cites the QI program as critical to the comprehensive
administration of taxes in a global economy.'5 Specifically, by bringing
foreign financial institutions more directly into the U.S. tax information
reporting system, the IRS hopes to better ensure that U.S. citizens with
investments managed by foreign institutions fulfill their obligations under
the U.S. tax code and that foreign persons are subject to the proper
withholding taxes.s 2 Effective January 1, 2001, UBS entered into a QI
agreement with the IRS. 1
As of the publication of this Note, elements of the QI program
remain in flux and the IRS and Treasury Department are currently
considering modifications to the program, which will include, among other
148 id
For example, dividends paid by U.S. companies to foreign
investors are subject to a withholding tax at a statutory rate of 30
percent, but if the investor resides in a country with a tax treaty
with the United States, the tax is reduced to 15 percent. To get
the 15 percent rate, the investor must either establish treaty
residence in advance or file for a refund from the IRS after the
fact. By making a U.S. investment through a QI, a foreign
investor can, for example, establish entitlement to withholding at
treaty rates without revealing information about himself or
herself to U.S. tax authorities or any other person within the
United States.
Id.
149 See Shulman Testimony, supra note 145, at 3.
1 Id.
'5' Id.
152 id
15 Brief for Respondent in Opposition to the Petition to Enforce the John Doe
Summons at 10, United States v. UBS AG, No. 1:09-CV-20423-Gold/McAliley
(S.D. Fla. July 7, 2007), available at
http://www.ubs.com/l/ShowMedialindex/crossborder/home?contentld=166528&na
me=UBSBrief.pdf.
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things, expanding the information reporting requirements for U.S.
customers holding foreign domiciled accounts and improving mechanisms
for evaluating the risks of circumvention of U.S. tax obligations by U.S.
citizens with such foreign domiciled accounts.154
C. European Union Savings Tax Directive (EUSTD or Directive)
The EUSTD was adopted in June 2003 and went into effect on July
1, 2005, as one element of a tax reform package initiated by the European
Commission in 1997.'" The Directive applies to interest paid to
individuals resident in an EU Member State other than the one where the
interest is paid.'16  Member States had to transpose its provisions into
national legislation.'
As originally drafted, the EU STD aimed to implement a uniform
"information exchange" regime to apply across the Union, with all
countries agreeing to report interest on savings paid to the citizens of other
Member States to those States' tax authorities. 58 In response to resistance
from EU Member States with strong traditions of banking secrecy however,
the Commission permitted a number of jurisdictions, including Austria,
Luxembourg, Belgium and Switzerland, to apply a withholding tax. In
November 2008, the EU Commission adopted an amended proposal to the
STD in an effort to close existing loopholes and better prevent tax evasion.
Among other things, the proposal extended the scope of the Directive to
include income equivalent to interest obtained through investments in some
innovative financial products and certain life insurance products.s 9
D. U.S. Legislation & Initiatives
1. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (BSA)
The BSA160 is the first piece of enacted U.S. legislation to directly
fight money laundering' 6' and today, serves as the primary directive in the
154 Shulman Testimony, supra note 145, at 3.
'5s See The Low Tax Library, http://www.lowtax.net/specials/std.html#exec (last
visited Feb. 1, 2010).
157 European Commission's Taxation and Customs Union Directorate-General,
http://ec.europa.eultaxationcustoms/taxation/personal tax/savings tax/indexen.h
tm (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
158 The Low Tax Library, supra note 155.
159 European Commission's Taxation and Customs Union Directorate-General,
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation customs/taxation/personaltax/savings tax/indexen.h
tm (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
' Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as
amendments in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1951-59, 5311-22
2010 Is Bank Secrecy Still Bankable?: 375
A Critical Review ofBank Secrecy Law, Tax Evasion
and UBS
U.S.'s efforts to detect and deter criminal financial activities.162 Designed
to prevent financial institutions from being used as intermediaries for, or to
hide the transfer or deposit of money derived from, criminal activity,6 the
BSA empowers the U.S. government to require that financial institutions
provide comprehensive reports of certain financial transactions.
Specifically, the BSA authorizes the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury to
promulgate regulations for the retention of records and the creation of
reports that have "a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory
investigations or proceedings."'6 It also authorizes the U.S. Treasury
Department to require financial institutions to report any "suspicious
transaction relevant to a possible violation of law or regulation."' 6
The U.S. Congress (Congress) passed the BSA in response to the
"unavailability of foreign and domestic bank records of customers thought
,,166to be engaged in illegal activities. In the late 1960s, Congress learned
that the proceeds of criminal activities conducted in the U.S. and large
amounts of unreported income were being deposited in foreign bank
accounts, predominantly in nations with strict bank secrecy laws.16 7 The
foreign bank secrecy laws hindered the efforts of U.S. investigators in two
ways: (1) the laws made it challenging for investigators to obtain financial
information from foreign financial institutions relating to the criminal
activity; and (2) even when U.S. investigators were successful in gaining
access to secret financial data, the privacy procedures mandated by foreign
laws frequently delayed the responses to their inquiries.1 68
(2009)). The BSA is also commonly referred to as (1) the "Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act," (2) an "anti-money laundering" law (AML), or (3)
"BSA/AML." Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Department of the
Treasury, http://www.fincen.gov/statutes regs/bsal (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).
161 IRS.gov, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=152532,00.html.
162 Government Accountability Office, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-212
(last visited Mar. 14, 2010).
'
6 3 LILIAN B. KLEIN, BANK SECRECY ACT: BACKGROUND, STATUTE AND
INTERPRETATION 1 (2007).
' Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 82 (1974).
165 FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GUIDANCE
To FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ON FILING SusPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS REGARDING
LOAN MODIFICATION/FORECLOSURE RESCUE SCAMS 2 (2009), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/statutes-regs/guidance/pdflfin-2009-aOO.pdf. These
reports, called Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), are filed with the Treasury
Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). Id.
'6 California Bankers Ass'n, 416 U.S. at 21.
167 L. RICHARD FISCHER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY T 4.01 (1998).
16 id.
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At the same time, U.S. financial institutions started to decrease
their in-house recordkeeping procedures.'6 9  Historically, U.S. financial
institutions routinely copied and recorded all checks that circulated through
the business and the details of any other substantial financial transactions.7 0
The federal government would then utilize these records to investigate and
prosecute suspected tax evasion and organized crime offenders."' Thus, as
financial institutions reduced their routine bookkeeping activity, it became
more difficult for federal investigators to perform their law enforcement
duties.17 2 To address these impediments, Congress passed the BSA."'
Since being implemented in 1970, the BSA has evolved through
amendments and the passage of additional legislation to improve the
efficacy of the laws and reporting requirements it promulgates.1 74 The most
recent comprehensive changes were made through the United and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act ("U.S. PATRIOT Act") of 2001.175
Ultimately, the BSA strives to ensure through its requirements that, among
other things, financial institutions are able to reconstruct questionable
transactions.176
2. Offshore Voluntary Compliance Initiatives
In January 2003, the IRS launched an Offshore Voluntary
Compliance Initiative (2003 OVCI) aimed at bringing taxpayers who used
"offshore" payment cards or other offshore financial arrangements to hide
their income back into compliance with U.S. tax law. 77 Under the 2003
OVCI, eligible taxpayers who turned themselves in would not face civil
fraud and information return penalties.17 8 However, taxpayers did still have
169 id
170
'73id
174 For a timeline of events, see Financial Crimes Enforcement Network,
Department of the Treasury, BSA Timeline,
http://www.fincen.gov/statutes-regs/bsa/bsatimeline.html (last visited Mar. 14,
2010).
1" KLIEN, supra note 163, at 74. See also The United and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
176 KLIEN, supra note 163, at 6.
' Press Release, IRS, IRS Unveils Offshore Voluntary Compliance Initiative;
Chance for 'Credit-Card Abusers' to Clear Up Their Tax Liabilities (Jan. 14,
2003), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=105689,00.html.
17 "id.
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to pay back taxes, interest and certain accuracy or delinquency penalties.
Eligible taxpayers who came forward also avoided criminal prosecution
based upon application of the revised voluntary disclosure practice. 8 0
In 2009, the IRS established a similar, but revised, offshore
voluntary disclosure program (2009 OVDP) to provide taxpayers with a
way into the reporting system while avoiding significant penalties. 181 The
stated objective of the 2009 OVDP was to bring taxpayers that have used
undisclosed foreign accounts and undisclosed foreign entities to avoid or
evade tax into compliance with United States tax laws.18 2 Additionally, the
information gathered from taxpayers making voluntary disclosures was
used to progress the IRS's understanding of how foreign accounts and
foreign entities are promoted to U.S. taxpayers as ways to avoid or evade
tax. 8 3
In response to the 2009 program, which ended in mid-October
2009, 14,700 Americans made voluntary disclosures of secret offshore bank
accounts to the IRS. 184 About 12,000 came after the August agreement
between the U.S. and Switzerland (discussed below in Section V(D)(2)).'
3. Obama Proposal
On May 4, 2009, President Obama announced a set of proposals to
"crack down on illegal overseas tax evasion, close loopholes, and make it
more profitable for companies to create jobs here in the United States."
Specifically, the proposals are intended to ensure that the U.S. tax code
does not "stack the deck against job creation" in the U.S. and that, it
179 id.
180 Id.
181 RSM McGladrey Tax Digest, http://www.rsmmcgladrey.com/Tax-Digest-
September-2009/Tax-Digest-September-2009-International?itemid=844&mid=844
(last visited, Feb. 1, 2010).
182 IRS.GOv, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2009), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
utl/faqs-revised_6_24_checked v2.pdf.
183 id,
18 Joseph Heaven, David Voreacos & Klaus Wille, UBS Client Wins Case on
Transfer of Tax Data to US. (Update4), BUS. WK., Jan. 22, 2010,
http://www.businessweek.com/news/20 10-01-22/ubs-client-wins-case-on-transfer-
of-tax-data-to-u-s-update3-.html.
Id.
1 Press Release, Grand Foyer, Remarks by the President on International Tax
Policy Reform (May 4, 2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/Remarks-By-The-President-On-
International-Tax-Policy-Reform.
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reduces "the amount of taxes lost to tax havens."l 87 Within these two broad
areas, the Obama administration proposed: (1) replacing tax advantages for
creating jobs overseas with incentives to create them at home; and (2)
cracking down on overseas tax havens. 88 With regard to the former, the
Administration suggested reforming deferral rules to curb a tax advantage
for investing and reinvesting overseas and closing foreign tax credit
loopholes and using savings to make permanent the tax credit for investing
in research and experimentation at home.'89 In addressing the latter, the
Administration recommended eliminating loopholes for "disappearing"
offshore subsidiaries, cracking down on the abuse of tax havens by
individuals and devoting new resources for IRS enforcement to help close
the international tax gap.190
V. CASE STUDY: UBS
Switzerland's neutrality and national sovereignty, long recognized
by foreign nations, has created a stable environment in which the Swiss
banking sector has been able to develop and thrive. 19' Recently, though,
UBS - Switzerland's largest bank - has become the focus of an
international tax scandal which could result in detrimental repercussions for
Swiss banking secrecy and the future of the Swiss banking system.19 2 At
the heart of the controversy are the definitions of "tax evasion" and "tax
fraud." Under Swiss Law, bank data can be transferred to foreign tax
authorities only in clear cases of tax fraud, not tax evasion.19' This is
because the latter is not a criminal offense in Switzerland. 19 4 Conversely,
U.S. law does not draw a distinction between the two terms and thus, both
may constitute a criminal offense.
This section examines (a) UBS' bank profile; (b) the relevant
provisions of Swiss and U.S. domestic law; (c) the history and content of
the intergovernmental information exchange provisions of the Swiss-U.S.
income tax treaty; (d) the announcement by the Government of Switzerland
of a change in policy regarding information exchange on tax evasion and
187 Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Leveling the
Playing Field: Curbing Tax Havens and Removing Tax Incentives For Shifting
Jobs Overseas (May 4, 2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_pressoffice/leveling-the-playing-field-curbing-
tax-havens-and-removing-tax-incentives-for-shifting-jobs-overseas/.
188 id.
189Id
190 Id
191 Bloomberg Businessweek, http://bx.businessweek.com/swiss-banking/ (last
visited Feb. 1, 2009).
192 ds
193 UBS Tax Deal is Swiss Bank Secrecy's Waterloo, supra note 68.
194id
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the related initiation of negotiations to amend the Swiss-U.S. treaty; (e) the
settlement between UBS and the U.S. and Swiss governments in August
2009 in an effort to create a pact that would abolish Swiss banking secrecy;
(f) and the current status of intergovernmental information exchanges
relating to the UBS matter.
A. UBS Bank Profile
Headquartered in Zurich and Basel, Switzerland, UBS provides
services in wealth management, investment banking, and asset management
to private, corporate and institutional clients around the world.' One of
Switzerland's two "big" banks, UBS and the Credit Suisse Group together
account for over fifty percent of the total balance sheet of all banks in the
country.196
Present in all major financial centers worldwide, UBS has offices in
over fifty countries and employs more than 65,000 people around the
world. Organizationally, thirty-six percent of UBS' employees work in the
Americas, thirty-six percent in Switzerland, fifteen percent in the rest of
Europe and thirteen percent in Asia Pacific.197 Shares of UBS are traded on
the SIX Swiss Exchange, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE)."'
UBS' self-proclaimed strategy is to concentrate on its three global
core businesses - wealth management, asset management and investment
banking - and retail and corporate banking services in Switzerland.199 The
company is a leading global wealth manager: it is a market leader (by client
assets) in both Europe and Asia Pacific, in sixth position in the U.S. and
one of the only firms of global scale focusing on wealth management as a
core business.200 In 2008, UBS was among the top five firms globally in
mergers and acquisitions based on deal volume.201
UBS is one of the leading active asset managers globally and one of
the largest mutual fund managers in Europe based on assets under
management. Additionally, UBS is the leading firm for retail and
commercial banking in Switzerland. It serves approximately 2.5 million
individual clients and 133,500 corporations, institutional investors, public
' UBS, http://www.ubs.com/1/e/about/ourprofile.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
196 Swiss Bankers Association, http://www.swissbanking.org/en/home/fs-
allgemein.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
197 UBS, supra note 195.
199Id
200 id
2o1 id
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entities and foundations, collectively.202 The bank limits its retail and
commercial banking business to the Swiss market, concentrating on
domestic opportunities and growing selected market segments.203
B. Legal Clash: US. v. Swiss Law
1. Tax Evasion and Fraud
The fundamental principal at the core of the U.S.-Swiss debate is
the distinction between tax evasion and tax fraud. Under Swiss law, fraud
presupposes criminal intent, whereas evasion can result from oversight.
Accordingly, tax fraud occurs when a taxpayer deliberately uses forged or
falsified documents in an effort to deceive the tax authorities and obtain
undue tax advantages.2 04 The Swiss defend this view, arguing that modem
tax law has become so complex and places such a high burden on the
untrained citizen that it is easy to misreport on tax returns and, ultimately,205
one should not be penalized for lack of competency in tax reporting.
On March 13, 2009, the Swiss Federal Council announced that in
addition to extending international administrative assistance based on its
double taxation agreements and bilateral treaties with the European Union,
administrative assistance would be offered on individual cases of well-
founded tax evasion. This addition brought Switzerland into line with
international standards.206
2. U.S. Domestic Law
a. Reporting obligations
U.S. federal tax returns require taxpayers to report interest and
ordinary dividends and capital gains. Specifically, Form 1040, Schedule B,
Part III (Foreign Accounts and Trusts), requires taxpayers to (1) disclose
any interest, or signatory, or other authority in a foreign financial account;
and (2) state the country where the account is held.207 Taxpayers that have
202 UBS,
http://www.ubs.com/l/e/investors/annual reporting2008/spr2008/0001.html (last
visited Feb. 1, 2010).
203 id
204 Swiss Bankers Association, supra note 44.
205 id
206 d
207 See IRS Form 1040, Schedule B - Interest and Ordinary Dividends (OMB No.
1545-0074), available at http://www.wbsonline.com/download.aspx?filelD=09-
form 1 040-scheduleb.pdf.
2010 Is Bank Secrecy Still Bankable?: 381
A Critical Review ofBank Secrecy Law, Tax Evasion
and UBS
such an interest or authority over a foreign account may also be required to
file a Foreign Bank Account Report (FBAR or Form TDF 90-22.1).208
The FBAR must be filed by all U.S. persons who have an interest,
signatory, or other authority over foreign accounts that have a combined
209
value of more than $10,000 at any time during the course of the year.
The FBAR requires filers to report their name, address, and taxpayer
identification number and disclose the type, location and account number of
the foreign bank accounts and the maximum amount held in the accounts.2 10
b. The criminal and civil risks of not disclosing an
offshore account
Under U.S. law, a taxpayer who does not timely report income held
offshore and neglects to participate in a voluntary disclosure risks
prosecution for tax evasion, filing a false return, the failure to file a tax
211
return and an FBAR, as well as conspiracy.
The U.S. crime of tax evasion requires (1) a deficiency in tax; (2)
an affirmative or attempted act of evasion; and (3) willfulness. The
violation carries with it an imprisonment term of up to five years and a fine
up to $250,000.212 Taxpayers with undeclared offshore accounts may also
be prosecuted for filing a false return.213
3. Swiss Law
a. Swiss tax system
To understand the role and limits of Swiss banking secrecy with
regard to tax offenses, it is important to first understand the Swiss approach
to combating tax evasion.2 14 The Swiss tax system is based on the
principles of "self-declaration" and "good-faith" by the taxpayer.215
208 IRS.gov, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=210244,00.html#FR2
(last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
209 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.24, 103.27(c) (2006); 31 U.S.C.A. § 5314 (West 2010).
210 id
211 Fran Obeid, 2009: The Year of Enforcement Action against Offshore Bank
Accounts, LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIs (2009), http://www.fo-
ml.com/docs/ObeidpubLEXNEXarticle 1 0609.pdf.
212 26 U.S.C.A. § 7201 (West 2010).
213 Terry Philip Segal & Michael Mustokoff, Advice for Tax Payers With
Undeclared UBS Swiss Bank Accounts, LAW. WKLY., Dec. 15, 2008, available at
http://www.duanemorris.com/articles/static/segalmustokoff mlw_12150 8.pdf
214 SWITZERLAND & ITS FINANCIAL CENTRE, SWISSBANKING.ORG (2007),
http://www.swissbanking.org/en/schweiz-finanzplatz.pdf.
215 See id
382 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW Vol. 5:1
JOURNAL
Information and documents that a client requests from a bank for the tax
authorities may only be passed from the bank to the client, not directly from
the bank to tax authorities, and not even the Swiss tax authorities have a
right to obtain client information directly from a Swiss bank outside of a
216criminal prosecution.
The only automatic reporting obligation Swiss banks have is the
legal obligation to report well-founded suspicions of money laundering to
the authorities. 2 17 Additionally, while it is not the responsibility of the bank
to oversee their clients' tax affairs, the bank cannot assist in tax evasion by
issuing misleading to incomplete attestations.2 18
From a technical perspective and with regard to the complexity of
the rules, the Swiss tax system is similar to that of large countries. It is
comprehensive - taxing, among other things, income, wealth, legal
transactions, consumption, possessions, and expenditures. 219 Accordingly,
Switzerland is not a tax haven in the traditional sense, as tax havens are
typically states or territories, which impose no taxes or only limited, low
taxes on income and assets.220
The Swiss taxation system is designed to follow the principles of a
modem tax system including: (1) covering the needs of local, cantonal and
federal governments; (2) distributing the tax burden according to economic
capability; (3) enforcing tax law; and (4) being flexible enough to permit
adjustments in accordance with the current economic climate.2 2 1 These
222principles are preserved in the Swiss Federal Constitution.
4. The Tax Treaty
Since 1996, a tax treaty between the U.S. and Switzerland has
provided for the exchange of information between the two countries for
216 id
217 id
218 Swiss Bankers Association, supra note 44.
219 The Swiss Tax System,
http://www.ch.ch/private/00093/00098/00453/00454/index.html?lang=en (last
visited Feb. 1, 2010).
220 See TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, IDENTIFYING TAX HAvENs AND OFFSHORE
FINANCE CENTRES 1 (2007),
www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/ldentifying_TaxHavens Jul 07.pdf.
221 Swiss CONFEDERATION FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE FDF, BANKING
SECRECY AND INTERNATIONAL TAX ISSUES (June 2009),
http://www.efd.admin.ch/themen/00796/01377/index.html?lang-en&download=M
3wBUQCu/8ulmKDu36WenojQ1NTTjaXZnqWfVp3Uhmfhnapmmc7Zi6rZnqCkk
IN5gHaCbKbXrZ2lhtTN34al3p6YrY7P I oahl 62apo3X 1 cjYh2+hoJVn6w- (last
visited Feb. 1, 2010).
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the prevention of tax fraud.223 The treaty did not extend, however, to tax
evasion, which, in Switzerland, is considered an administrative matter and
may be punished by no more than a fine.2 24
In mid-1996, as part of negotiations to update their 1951 income
tax treaty, the U.S. and Switzerland modified the provisions on exchange
of information. That new language was incorporated into the Convention
Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income (Tax
Treaty), signed on October 2, 1996.225
The rules and procedures set out in Article 26 of the Tax Treaty
provide the legal basis for Switzerland to exchange information concerning
tax issues with the United States. Article 26 states in relevant part:
The competent authorities to the Contracting States shall
exchange information (being information available under
the respective taxation laws of the Contracting States) as is
necessary for carrying out the provisions of the present
Convention for the prevention of tax fraud or the like in
relation to the taxes which are subject of the present
Convention. In cases of tax fraud,
(a) the exchange of information is not restricted by Article
I (Personal Scope) and
(b) if specifically requested by the competent authority of
the Contracting State, the competent authority of the
other Contracting State shall provide information under
this Article in the form of authenticated copies of
unedited original records or documents.
Additionally, the Tax Treaty generally followed the OECD Model
Tax Convention on Income and Capital (OECD Model Convention), which
fails to authorize "fishing expeditions."226 Specifically, Article 26 of the
223 Obeid, supra note 211, at n.19.
224 id
225 United States v. UBS AG, No. 109CV20423, 2009 WL 1612393, at *9 (S.D.
Fla. 2009). The basic rules for interpreting treaties are set out in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties of May 23, 1969 (Vienna Convention). Vienna
Convention Article 26 states that a treaty is "binding upon the parties to it and must
be performed by them in good faith." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
May 23, 1960, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
226 OECD, AGREEMENT ON EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON TAX MATTERS 14
(2005), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/43/2082215.pdf.
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OECD Model Convention requires a degree of relevancy or specificity for
the exchange of information. Article 26 (Exchange of Information) states:
The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall
exchange such information as is foreseeably relevant for
carrying out the provisions of this Convention or to the
administration or enforcement of the domestic laws
concerning taxes of every kind and description imposed on
behalf of the Contracting States, or of their political
subdivisions or local authorities, insofar as the taxation
thereunder is not contrary to the Convention. 22 7
Simultaneously, the U.S. and Switzerland executed a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) and a Protocol, which elaborated the meaning of
the term "tax fraud or the like" for purposes of the exchange of information
128provisions.
On September 23, 2009, the U.S. and Switzerland modified the
income tax treaty between the two countries.229 The amended protocol
provides for the "exchange of information in tax matters to the widest
possible extent without allowing the Contracting States to engage in
'fishing expeditions' or to request information that is unlikely to be relevant
to the tax affairs of a given taxpayer." 230 Additionally, the revised protocol
mandates that the State seeking the information submit a request
containing: (1) information identifying the person under investigation; (2)
the time period for which the information is requested; (3) a description of
the information sought and the tax purpose for seeking the information; and
(4) information identifying the person thought to be in possession of the
requested information.231 If the U.S. and Switzerland cannot reach an
agreement in a specific case governed by the treaty, a mandatory arbitration
proceeding will resolve the dispute.232
a. International judicial assistance in criminal matters
Switzerland assists the authorities of foreign states in criminal
matters in accordance with the Federal Act on International Mutual
227 OECD, MODEL TAx CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL art. 26 (2006),
(emphasis added).
228 UBS AG, 2009 WL 1612393, at *9.
229 Obeid, supra note 211, at 5.
230 Id. at 5 n.23; Protocol Amending the Convention Between the Swiss
Confederation and United States of America for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Switz., Doc. 2009-21197, Sept. 23, 2009
[hereinafter Protocol].
231 Obeid, supra note 211, at 5; Protocol, supra note 230, art. 4, 10(b).
232 Obeid, supra note 211, at 5; Protocol, supra note 230, art. 2.
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Assistance in Criminal Matters (IMAC).233 The IMAC permits assets to be
frozen and, if necessary, submitted to relevant foreign officials.234
International mutual assistance in criminal matters is based on the
principles of dual criminality, specificity, and proportionality.23 5 Under the
dual criminality rule, Swiss courts only employ coercive measures - such as
lifting the requirement of bank-client confidentiality - if the act being
investigated is punishable under the law of both the requesting state and
Switzerland.2 36 Under the specificity rule, information gained through the
mutual assistance arrangement can be used only for criminal proceedings
for which the assistance is provided.23 7 Finally, in accordance with the
proportionality rule, coercive measures are denied in the case of minor
offenses or where there is a risk that the interests of persons not directly
involved with the matter will be adversely affected by the proceedings. 238
C. Case Profile: Timeline ofRelevant ofEvents
1. The John Doe Summons
On July 1, 2008, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida granted the IRS permission to serve a "John Doe"
summons on UBS. 2 39 A "John Doe" summons is a summons made out to
an unidentified defendant or class of defendants, which is referred to in the
summons as "John Doe(s)."24 0
The summons petition was established in response to the
indictment of former UBS executive Bradley Birkenfeld, who pleaded
guilty to charges of conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the U.S. on
June 19, 2008.241 As part of his plea, Birkenfeld admitted that he and other
UBS executives aided U.S. taxpayers in evading tax through several means,
including: (1) establishing offshore shell companies as nominee owners of
233 Swiss Bankers Association, supra note 44. The IMAC was entered into on
March 20, 1981. Id. An unofficial translation of the IMAC is available at
http://www.rhf.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/rhfrecht.Par.0016.File.tmp/sr351-1-
e_070101.pdf.
234 id
235 id.
236 id
237 id
238 id
239 Report of AlixParnters at 1, United States v. UBS AG, No. 109CV20423, 2009
WL 1612393 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
240 Orlando Fernandez, UBS. Taxing Times for Swiss Banking Secrecy?, PRAC. L.
Co. CROSs-BORDER, Sept. 21, 2009, http://crossborder.practicallaw.com/8-500-
2330.
241 Id
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Swiss and Liechtenstein bank accounts to conceal the beneficial ownership
of the accounts; and (2) preparing fraudulent tax returns, which concealed
the beneficial owners of the accounts.242 The summons identified the John
Doe class as U.S. taxpayers who: (1) between December 31, 2002, and
December 31, 2007; (2) had signatory or other authority with respect to any
financial accounts; (3) maintained at, monitored by, or managed through
any Swiss office of UBS, its subsidiaries or affiliated in Switzerland; and
(4) for whom UBS AG or its subsidiaries and affiliates did not have in its
possession Forms W-9 executed by such U.S. taxpayers, and had not filed
timely and accurate Forms 1099 naming such taxpayers and reporting to the
IRS all payments made to them.243 The original summons was believed to
apply to approximately 17,000 U.S. taxpayers holding US$20 billion assets
under management in "undeclared" accounts.2 "
2. IRS Attempt to Enforce the Summons
In February 2009, the IRS and the DOJ filed a lawsuit against UBS
in an effort to enforce the John Doe Summons and order the disclosure of
52,000 UBS clients with accounts holding a combined US$14.8 billion in
assets. UBS opposed the enforcement of the John Doe Summons,
arguing the company's compliance would: (1) directly violate Swiss
privacy law provisions regarding the principle of banking secrecy; and (2)
overlook the procedure for tax information exchange arranged in the DTA
between the U.S. and Switzerland.24 6  The Swiss government filed an
amicus brief in support of UBS' position and noted that the Swiss
government expressed its objections to the summons to State Department
officials.247
D. The August 2009 Settlement
1. Overview
On August 19, 2009, the Swiss and U.S. governments published the
terms of an agreement (UBS Agreement) intended to end the dispute over
the enforcement of a John Doe summons requesting the names of 52,000
242 id
243 id
244 id
245 Peter D. Hardy & Thomas E. Zehole, Deferred Prosecution Agreement Struck
With Swiss Bank UBS as Government Tightens Enforcement Net Around Foreign
Accounts, POST & SCHELL LLC 4-5 (2008),
http://www.postschell.com/docs/publications/419.pdf
246 Fernindez, supra note 240; see also Petition to Enforce John Doe Summons,
United States v. UBS AG, No. 109CV20423, 2009 WL 1612393 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
247 Amicus brief of the Government of Switzerland at 10, United States of America
v. UBS AG , No. 109CV20423, 2009 WL 1612394 (S.D.Fla. April 30, 2009).
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UBS clients suspected of tax evasion in the U.S. 24 8 Under the UBS
Agreement, Switzerland arranged to release account information relating to
approximately 4450 UBS accountholders to the U.S. through the procedure
provided by the unrevised DTT between both countries.249 Specifically, the
UBS Agreement provides that Switzerland will process the treaty request of
the U.S. in an expedited manner, but that UBS will give notice to the
accountholders prior to the disclosure of any bank information in order to
provide the accountholders with the opportunity to fight the disclosure in
Swiss courts.250
UBS has also disclosed the identities of about 250 American UBS
clients under a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) that it signed with
the U.S. tax authorities on February 20, 2009.251 The DPA was entered into
after the DOJ charged UBS with "conspiracy to defraud by impeding the
IRS." 252 Under the DPA, UBS also agreed to pay $780 million to settle
civil and criminal charges by the U.S. government that the bank assisted
thousands of American clients evade U.S. taxes through the use of Swiss
bank accounts.253
2. Key Terms
It was widely contended by practitioners that a substantial
disclosure of names - even if short of the 52,000 requested - was
unavoidable.254 The primary issue was whether the disclosure would be
conveyed through the established DTT procedure or an alternative
method.25 5 The method of conveyance was consequential because any
method other than the DTT would have a greater adverse impact on Swiss
banking confidentiality.256
The UBS Agreement contains the following key provisionS257.
248 See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Swiss
Confederation, U.S.-Switz., Doc. 2009-18745, Aug. 19, 2009,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/us-swiss govemment agreement.pdf.
249 Fernindez, supra note 240. See also Agreement Between the United States of
America and the Swiss Confederation, supra note 248.
250 id.
251 Fernindez, supra note 240.
252 Id.
253 David S. Hilzenrath & Zachary A. Goldfarb, UBS to Pay $780 Million Over
U.S. Tax Charges, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2009, at Dl.254 Ferindez, supra note 240.
255 id.
256 d
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* The U.S. will file a request under the existing DTT regarding
American UBS account-holders (estimated 4450) meeting a set
of criteria listed in a currently confidential annex to the
agreement (the Treaty Request). Then, the government, acting
through the Swiss Federal Tax Administration will make a
decision, within 90 days of the receipt of the Treaty Request,
on the first 500 names and the remaining names on a
continuing basis for up to 360 days (Article 1).
* The U.S. and Swiss governments will sign a new protocol to
their DTT by September 30, 2009 (Article 2).
* The U.S. will dismiss its enforcement action relating to the
John Doe summons and not pursue reinforcement while the
agreement remains in force. It will also completely withdraw
the summons in relation to: (1) accounts not covered by the
December 31, 2009 Treaty Request; and (2) subject to
satisfactory disclosure by UBS, accounts covered by the
request no later than 370 days after the signing of the
agreement (Article 3).
* The compliance timetable establishes that UBS must process:
(1) the first 500 cases sixty days after receipt of the Treaty
Request by the SFTA; (2) the remaining cases referenced in the
Annex to the agreement within 180 days; and (3) all
outstanding cases within 270 days (Article 4).
* The agreement authorizes either party to take "rebalancing
measures" if, 370 days after signing, "the actual and anticipated
results differ significantly from what can reasonably be
expected." These measures may not go beyond preserving the
legal situation of either party, which existed immediately prior
to such measures being taken, or impose additional obligations
on UBS (Article 5).
E. Swiss Court Ruling: UBS Client Wins Case on Transfer of Tax
Data to U.S.
1. Judgment
In January 2010, two Swiss courts ruled that Switzerland's
financial regulator, the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority
(FINMA), broke the law when it ordered UBS to surrender data to U.S.
authorities on nearly 300 clients suspected of evading taxes.258 The ruling
258 Lynnley Browning, Swiss Back Away from Deal to Give Names ofRich UBS
Clients to US., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010, at 3.
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came as the result of a test case brought on behalf of a U.S. citizen that
challenged the UBS Agreement and specifically, Switzerland's
commitment to disclose details of suspected tax avoiders. 25 9 Though the
full effects are not yet clear, the landmark ruling may destabilize the
agreement for Switzerland to communicate information regarding as many
as 4,450 UBS accounts to the U.S. and could impede the concentrated
global effort to crackdown on overseas tax evasion.260
In a sixty-page ruling, the Federal Administrative Court in Bern
said that failure to complete a tax form did not constitute fraudulent
behavior, regardless of whether large sums of money were involved.
"Provided the taxpayer did nothing more than not declare income, an
account or return the form W-9, consequently committing tax evasion under
Swiss law, he hasn't acted fraudulently," the five judges wrote.26 1
Additionally, the Court ruled that because the government and the
parliament are the only institutions with the authority to implement state of
emergency laws, FINMA transgressed its mandate by facilitating the UBS
Agreement.26 2 The Court concluded that tax evasion - not tax fraud - was at
issue and, therefore, traditional Swiss banking secrecy rules applied. As of
the submission of this Note, FINMA has not announced if it will appeal the
ruling to the Swiss Supreme Court.26 3
2. Effect of Court Ruling on Swiss-U.S. Tax Agreement
While it is too late to stop the transmission of certain client data,
the ruling from Bern could influence the course of future cases, as
Switzerland remains embroiled in disputes regarding tax evasion and the
implementation of the UBS Agreement.
The international repercussions of the U.S.-UBS dispute have the
potential to be grave; not only for Switzerland and its long-standing
tradition of bank secrecy, but also for the global existence of banking
secrecy laws. A seemingly nominal success by U.S. tax authorities could
259 UBS: Swiss Court Upholds US Taxpayer's Appeal in Test Case, FRANCE 24, Jan.
22, 2010, http://www.france24.com/en/20100122-ubs-swiss-court-upholds-us-
taxpayers-appeal-test-case.
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encourage tax authorities in a multitude of jurisdictions to pursue a similar
strategy.264 For example, tax experts report that Germany and France are
closely monitoring the progression of the UBS Agreement and may employ
similar actions against their own banks if the U.S. emerges victoriously. 26 5
UBS itself has warned of the potential for ensuing actions by other
states in its latest filing: "Following disclosure of the U.S. cross-border
matter, it is possible that tax or regulatory authorities in various
jurisdictions will focus on the cross-border wealth management services
provided by UBS and other financial institutions..."2 66 Additionally, tax
experts profess that even if Switzerland continues to retain some of its
privacy rules, the country and other smaller jurisdictions will feel
compelled to increasingly cooperate with Western tax authorities when
prompted to avoid costly (and potentially demising) litigation.267
Finally, IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman said in a TV interview
that the agreement "blows a big hole in bank secrecy." 268 As he explained,
U.S. tax authorities have never before been able to gain access to secret
bank accounts in Switzerland, and now, that dynamic could change
forever.26 9
The ruling out of Bern creates a flicker of hope for those seeking
privacy on the Swiss shores. However, proponents of Swiss banking
secrecy cannot yet declare victory. The Swiss government is scrambling to
rescue the Agreement it worked so hard to complete. Switzerland and the
U.S. said in an annex to the UBS settlement agreement that U.S. citizens
who benefited from offshore company accounts with UBS between 2001
and 2008, as well as U.S.-based clients of UBS who failed to disclose
accounts or deposits in excess of 1 million CHF (US$960,000), could be
covered by the agreement if there is a reasonable suspicion of "tax fraud or
the like." 27 0 However, the court called the annex an MOU that did not alter
the 1996 DTT.27 1 Of the 4450 cases, 250 accounts involved fraud,
including the use of false documentation and a "scheme of lies," and the
remaining 4200 were situations of "continued serious tax offenses." 272
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At present, the Swiss government is planning to seek retrospective
parliamentary approval for the UBS Agreement after it amends its text to
"remedy the shortcomings" highlighted by the Federal Administrative
Court.273 In its holding, the Court proclaimed the UBS Agreement ignored
aspects of Swiss banking secrecy rules, including safeguards that prevent
the government from surrendering files to foreign tax authorities except in
cases of deliberate fraud.274  Parliamentary approval would elevate the
status of the UBS Agreement from simply a "mutual agreement" to that of a
treaty and would thus, give the Agreement official legal standing in
Switzerland.2 7 5 The IRS said it "ha[s] every expectation that the Swiss
government will continue to honor the terms of the agreement."276
VI. CONCLUSION
Prompted by the UBS tax evasion scandal and inflamed by the poor
global economic climate, the Swiss government has been tasked with
reexamining its banking industry regulations.27 7 For some, Swiss banking
secrecy is the staple of a strong offshore economy meant to protect the
innocent rather than shield the guilty.278 For others, it fosters a dubious,
even harmful, institution that must be politically challenged.279
An increasing number of voices are speaking up against banking
secrecy, which, under current Swiss law, can only be bypassed if a client is
suspecting of defrauding tax authorities, rather than simply not declaring all
assets.2 80 As reported in a March 2009 Time article, fifty-six percent of
Swiss citizens support aiding foreign countries in their quest to identify tax
evaders, up from twenty-percent in 2008.281 Additionally, some industry
insiders agree that changes to the law might be inevitable to avoid
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continued pressure from abroad. But, whether the current uproar will
permanently weaken confidence in the banking sector and ultimately warp
the seventy-five-year-old banking secrecy law remains to be seen.282
282 id
